If emotions guide consciousness, people may recognize degraded objects in center view more accurately if they either fear the objects or are disgusted by them. Therefore, we studied whether recognition of spiders and snakes correlates with individual differences in spider fear, snake fear, and disgust sensitivity. Female students performed a recognition task with pictures of spiders, snakes, flowers, and mushrooms as well as blanks. Pictures were backward masked to reduce picture visibility. Signal detection analyses showed that recognition of spiders and snakes was correlated with disgust sensitivity but not with fear of spiders or snakes. Further, spider fear correlated with the tendency to misinterpret blanks as threatening (response bias). These findings suggest that effects on recognition and response biases to emotional pictures vary for different emotions and emotional traits. Whereas fear may induce response biases, disgust may facilitate recognition.
Sensory systems have only limited capacity (Shevrin & Dickman, 1980) , but emotions may play an important role in overcoming this limitation by allocating sensory processing resources effectively (LeDoux, 2000; Ö hman & Mineka, 2001 ). First, people may direct attention to emotional rather than nonemotional input (e.g., attentional bias; Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijendoorn, 2007) . Second, people may process spatially attended emotional input even if they remain unconscious of the input (e.g., subliminal emotion perception; Wiens, 2006a) . Third, people may be more likely to become conscious of attended input if the input is emotional (e.g., attentional blink, Anderson & Phelps, 2001 ). This preferential access to consciousness would facilitate strategic and flexible responding (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001) . So, if it is true that attended objects are recognized preferentially if they have emotional value, then people who are afraid of spiders should be able to recognize spiders in center view even if these are barely visible (Becker & Rinck, 2004) . Because recognition performance is often used as an index of consciousness (Wiens, 2007) , such a finding would support the notion that fear and maybe other emotions can facilitate consciousness of attended input.
However, several studies suggest that individual differences in fear as a trait variable do not correlate with recognition of threat (Becker & Rinck, 2004; Ö hman & Soares, 1994; Windmann & Krüger, 1998; Winton, Clark, & Edelmann, 1995;  for an early review, see Mathews & MacLeod, 1994) . In these studies, threat pictures were shown briefly and were followed immediately by a scrambled picture to reduce picture visibility (backward masking; for a review, see Wiens & Ö hman, 2007) . The studies found no relationship between social anxiety and recognition of masked negative facial expressions among masked neutral facial expressions (Winton et al., 1995) , between panic disorder and recognition of masked threat words (Windmann & Krüger, 1998) , and between small-animal phobia and recognition of spiders or snakes (spider fear, Becker & Rinck, 2004; spider and snake fear, Ö hman & Soares, 1994) .
Although the null findings for small-animal phobia do not support an association between fear of spiders or snakes and threat recognition (Becker & Rinck, 2004; Ö hman & Soares, 1994) , they may have been because of methodological problems and low power. First, the Ö hman and Soares (1994) study had only a small sample size (n Ͻ 9 in each group) and thus low power. Second, because in masking, pictures are flashed briefly, participants may have difficulty recognizing the brief pictures even without masking. So, because the Becker and Rinck (2004) study did not demonstrate that participants could actually recognize the brief pictures when they were not masked, it is unresolved whether general difficulties in recognizing the pictures may have limited performance range and thus reduced the study's power to detect a relationship between spider fear and spider recognition.
Further, even if fear plays no role in affecting recognition performance, other emotions may do so. In particular, disgust may affect recognition of threat from small animals such as spiders, cockroaches, maggots, snails, slugs, snakes, and rats. In part, these animals may be threatening for the same reason that large animals are: A physical attack may motivate fear associated with predator defense (Ö hman, 1986) . More important, these animals may be threatening because they can be carriers of harmful diseases. This threat of contamination may motivate disgust associated with disease avoidance (Curtis & Biran, 2001; Matchett & Davey, 1991) . In support of the idea that small-animal phobia is associated with disgust, various studies have found that spider-fearful participants rate spiders as highly disgusting (Sawchuk, Lohr, Westendorf, Meunier, & Tolin, 2002; Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1998; Tolin, Lohr, Sawchuk, & Lee, 1997) , show disgusted facial expressions to spiders (de Jong, Peters, & Vanderhallen, 2002; Vernon & Berenbaum, 2002) , and avoid eating a cookie that was touched (and thus contaminated) by a spider (Mulkens, de Jong, & Merckelbach, 1996) .
Research has further shown that small-animal phobia correlates positively with disgust sensitivity. Disgust sensitivity is a trait that affects how easily a person responds with disgust in several contexts: food, body products, sex, animals, body envelope violations, death, hygiene, and magical thinking (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994) . When measured with a 32-item questionnaire, disgust sensitivity exhibits good test-retest reliability (r ϭ .79 for a 2-month interval) and predicts actual disgust responses to disgusting stimuli (Rozin, Haidt, McCauley, Dunlop, & Ashmore, 1999) . However, although it has been argued that the disgust contexts can be separated (Haidt et al., 1994) , evidence suggests that only the global score has acceptable psychometric properties (Björklund & Hursti, 2004) . Research has found a positive relationship between disgust sensitivity and spider fear (de Jong & Merckelbach, 1998; Merckelbach, de Jong, Arntz, & Schouten, 1993; Mulkens et al., 1996; Osswald & Reinecker, 2004; Sawchuk, Lohr, Tolin, Lee, & Kleinknecht, 2000; Tolin et al., 1997) and between disgust sensitivity and snake fear (Klieger & Siejak, 1997) . Although the causal role of disgust in fear is debated (Davey & Bond, 2006; Edwards & Salkovskis, 2006; Marzillier & Davey, 2005) , disgust sensitivity may correlate with spider fear independently of other variables (e.g., trait anxiety, neuroticism) (Mulkens et al., 1996; Olatunji, 2006) and predict disgust responses to spiders over and above spider fear, negative affect, contamination fear, and trait anxiety (Olatunji & Deacon, 2008) .
Because it may be that disgust sensitivity rather than fear correlates with threat recognition in center view, we studied correlations between spider fear, snake fear, and disgust sensitivity and recognition of spiders, snakes, flowers, and mushrooms. On each trial, a picture from one of these categories or a blank (catch trial) was shown briefly and followed by a scrambled picture to reduce the visibility of the first picture (backward masking). After each trial, participants indicated whether the first picture was a spider, snake, flower, or mushroom. Based on these responses, signal detection analyses (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) were performed to distinguish between recognition (dЈ) and response bias (C). We expected that if fear facilitates recognition, spider fear (or snake fear) would be correlated with recognition of spiders (or snakes) but not with recognition of flowers and mushrooms. Similarly, if disgust sensitivity facilitates recognition, disgust sensitivity would be correlated with recognition of spiders and snakes but not with recognition of flowers and mushrooms.
Whereas previous studies found no evidence that fear facilitates threat recognition, several studies have found that fear correlates with response biases (Becker & Rinck, 2004; Kolassa et al., 2007; Windmann & Krüger, 1998; Winton et al., 1995) . In these studies, response biases were associated with a greater tendency to misinterpret nonthreatening input as threatening (false alarms). For example, spider-fearful individuals were not better than nonfearful individuals in detecting spiders but had a stronger tendency to misinterpret distorted original pictures (catch trials) as spiders (Becker & Rinck, 2004) . However, the results of the Becker and Rinck study may be attributable, in part or completely, to the specific task setup. Because participants were told before each block that pictures would be taken only from a particular category, spider-fearful individuals might have been primed to indicate that they saw spiders during the spider block. This tendency might have been enhanced by the fact that pictures shown in catch trials were actually distorted versions of the original pictures that retained the color and maybe even other features of the original pictures. To avoid these problems, we presented participants with four pictures categories and informed them before the task that the four picture categories would be shown equally often. In addition, catch trials were blank to avoid any resemblance with the actual pictures.
In summary, this study assessed correlations of spider fear, snake fear, and disgust sensitivity with recognition and response biases to masked pictures of spiders, snakes, flowers, and mushrooms. Picture visibility was manipulated with stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs) of 12, 24, 36, and 200 milliseconds between pictures and masks. Blank trials (i.e., no target pictures) were included to assess participants' tendency to interpret nonthreatening input (blanks) as threatening (false alarms). Blanks were shown only at the shortest SOA to enhance participants' beliefs that there was a target picture on each trial. The longest SOA (200 milliseconds) was included as a control condition to demonstrate that participants could detect targets well if pictures were shown briefly but masking was ineffective. The three short SOAs were included to determine whether any relationship of recognition with fear and disgust sensitivity would vary with changes in picture visibility (cf. Wiens, 2006b ). However, a potential difficulty of this approach is that with complete masking, recognition might be eliminated for all participants, and this floor effect might reduce power in detecting correlations between recognition performance and other variables. Because this risk was considerable for results from the 12-ms SOA, power in detecting effects was presumed to be strongest at the 24-and 36-ms SOAs.
Method

Participants
Participants were 53 women (mean age ϭ 24.98, SD ϭ 3.72, range was 20 to 35 years) who responded to advertisements for female participants at Stockholm University, Sweden. Participants were informed that they would be shown brief pictures of snakes, spiders, mushrooms, and flowers and that their task would be to recognize the pictures. They were asked to fill out short questionnaires either in person or online about their fears of spiders and snakes. Later, they were contacted and scheduled for an individual session that lasted 45 minutes. There were no selection criteria except that only women were recruited because too few men report spider or snake fear to assess gender effects (e.g., Becker & Rinck, 2004) . Participation was based on informed consent and was rewarded with a movie voucher (worth $8 U.S.).
Materials
Forty pictures each of spiders, snakes, flowers, and mushrooms were selected from various sources (e.g., World Wide Web). For each picture, the background was removed, color converted to eight-bit gray scale, and size adjusted to fit within a window of 512 ϫ 512 pixels. Pictures were further adjusted so that mean number of pixels, mean luminance, and mean contrast (i.e., standard deviation of luminance) did not differ among the four picture categories. Thus, luminance, contrast, and number of pixels could not confound results. The resulting 160 gray-scale pictures served as targets. Two additional pictures of each category were used for practice. Backgrounds and masking pictures were created from a collage (520 ϫ 520 pixels) of original color pictures from all four categories. This collage was divided into squares of 10 ϫ 10 pixels, and the positions of the 2704 (52 ϫ 52) squares in the collage were shuffled randomly so that target features were no longer discernable (scrambled). This shuffling procedure was repeated 100 times to generate 50 background and 50 masking pictures. Figure 1 shows examples of target pictures with backgrounds.
The experiment was run on a desktop PC with a standard 17-inch CRT monitor (Dell, E771p). Screen resolution was 1024 ϫ 768 pixels, refresh rate was 85 Hz, and the experiment was programmed in Presentation 9.9 (Neurobehavioral Systems, www.neurobs.com). Pictures were shown at a distance of 1 meter; thus, they were shown within horizontal and vertical visual angles of 9.3 degrees.
Participants completed several questionnaires before and after the experiment. Before recruitment, they filled out questionnaires that were modeled after the SAS (Spinnenangstscreening) for spiders (Rinck et al., 2002) and assessed how much participants were afraid of spiders (or snakes), avoided them, became physiologically upset, and were bothered by their fear. Each of the four items was rated on a 7-point scale (from 0 to 6), and the points were added to yield a separate score for spider and snake fear between 0 and 24. After the recognition task, participants rated their own performance in recognizing each picture category compared to the performance of the average participant on a nine-point scale from Ϫ4 (much worse than average) to ϩ4 (much better than average). Participants also rated the extent of discernable details (clarity) of each picture category across trials on a 5-point scale. Further, they rated (in percent) how often they saw (consciously) spiders, snakes, mushrooms, flowers, or nothing discernable. At the end of the experiment, participants completed short versions of the Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ) and the Snake Phobia Questionnaires (SNAQ) (Klorman, Weerts, Hastings, Melamed, & Lang, 1974) . The SPQ consisted of 18 true-or-false items and the SNAQ of 20 items. Participants also completed a 32-item ques- Figure 1 . Four example target pictures with backgrounds. Targets were grayscale spiders, snakes, flowers, and mushrooms; these were shown on a colored scrambled background. Targets were adjusted so that mean numbers of pixels, luminance, and contrast did not differ among categories. On each trial, a single 12-ms target or blank (i.e., catch trial with background only) in center view was followed by a 200-ms mask (i.e., backward masked) at one of four stimulus onset asynchronies (12, 24, 36, or 200 milliseconds) . Different versions of a randomly scrambled color collage served as backgrounds and masks. tionnaire on disgust sensitivity (Björklund & Hursti, 2004; Haidt et al., 1994) and the 20-item STAI-trait anxiety inventory (Spielberger, 1983) .
Procedure
Recognition task. Participants were informed that they would be shown two brief pictures shortly after each other and that the second picture would always be a scrambled picture. Their task was to indicate whether they thought that the first picture depicted a snake, spider, flower, or mushroom. Participants were further instructed that because the first picture would be shown only briefly, they might have difficulties in recognizing the picture. Nonetheless, they were to respond anyway even if they were guessing. After each picture presentation, a response prompt appeared in the center of the screen and individual category labels replaced each other with mouse movements. The order of the labels was randomized for each participant. Participants moved the mouse until the label of their choice was shown, and clicked the left mouse button to indicate their response. There was no time limit in responding. Participants were told that the four categories would be shown equally often and that trial order would be random and thus independent of their responses.
Target pictures were shown for a constant duration of 12 milliseconds (1 refresh cycle at an 85-Hz refresh rate) (Wiens et al., 2004) . Stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between target and mask was 12 milliseconds (1 refresh cycle), 24 milliseconds (2 cycles), 36 milliseconds (3 cycles), or 200 milliseconds (17 cycles). Masking pictures were shown for 200 milliseconds (17 refresh cycles). The response prompt appeared 300 milliseconds after the mask. After a response, the next trial started randomly after between 300 and 500 milliseconds. On 50 consecutive trials, the 50 background and 50 masking pictures were used once in random order.
The main task consisted of two blocks (200 trials each) separated by a 5-minute rest. Each block contained 4 (picture category) ϫ 4 (SOA) ϫ 10 ϭ 160 target trials. The remaining 40 trials consisted of blank trials (i.e., background as target) with a 12-milliseconds SOA between target and mask. For each participant, 10 of the 40 target pictures in each category were randomly assigned to each of the four SOAs. Trial order was randomized for each participant and each block. Before the actual task, participants performed a practice task to familiarize them with the use of the mouse and with the experience that picture recognition would be difficult. The practice task consisted of 10 trials. Eight practice pictures (two in each category) were shown at the longest SOA and two blank trials at the shortest SOA. After the actual task, participants answered questions about their experience of the task (i.e., ratings of performance, picture clarity, and picture count).
Picture rating task. After the recognition task, participants rated emotional valence of each of the 160 target pictures on a 9-point scale that ranged from Ϫ4 (very negative) to ϩ4 (very positive). For each participant, trial order was randomized. Below each picture, a response prompt was shown and was replaced by number labels (between Ϫ4 and ϩ4) that changed with mouse movements. Pictures were shown until participants responded, but participants were instructed to indicate their spontaneous impression of the pictures. Before this task, participants familiarized themselves with the task by rating the practice pictures.
Data Reduction
Signal detection analyses (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) of the recognition data separated recognition (dЈ) from response bias (C) for each category and SOA. Signal detection theory stipulates that participants can only discriminate between signal (e.g., spider pictures) and noise (e.g., blanks) if signals generally tend to evoke a greater sensory strength of evidence than noise (for a discussion of signal detection in masking studies, see Wiens, 2006b ). Responses are coded as hits (e.g., spider response to spider pictures) and false alarms (e.g., spider response to blanks). Participants who can discriminate between spiders and blanks would respond spider to most of the spider pictures (i.e., hit rate is high) but not to blanks (i.e., false alarm rate is low). The discrimination index dЈ is computed as dЈ ϭ z hit rate -z false alarm rate ; thus, it is the distance between the means of the signal and noise distributions in z scores. The criterion C is computed as C ϭ Ϫ0.5 ‫ء‬ (z hit rate ϩ z false alarm rate ); thus, it is the z-score distance from the intersection point of signal and noise distributions. Participants are unbiased if they are as likely to misinterpret noise as signal (false alarm) as they are likely to report signal as noise (miss); thus, if false alarm rate equals miss rate, then C ϭ 0. For example, if the hit rate is 0.80 and the false alarm rate is 0.20, then the miss rate (which is 1 -hit rate) is also 0.20. Because for a hit rate of 0.80, z hit rate ϭ 0.842, and for a false alarm rate of 0.20, z false alarm rate ϭ Ϫ.842, C ϭ Ϫ0.5 ‫ء‬ (0.842 -0.842) ϭ 0. Participants with a liberal response bias would be more willing to produce false alarms (C Ͻ 0) whereas participants with a conservative response bias would be less willing to produce false alarms (C Ͼ 0).
Because z scores (for dЈ and C) can be computed only for rates that are greater than 0 and less than 1, we avoided these extreme rates as follows: To compute each rate, half a trial was added as a response (in numerator) and one trial was added to the total number of possible responses (in denominator) (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988) . For example, the corrected hit rates for spiders at each SOA were: (Number of spider hits ϩ 0.5)/(total number of spider trials ϩ 1); the total number of spider trials at each SOA was 20. Because 0.5 was added in the numerator, the numerator was never zero and, thus, each rate exceeded zero. In addition, because 1 was added in the denominator, the denominator was always greater than the numerator and, thus, each rate was always less than 1. Similar to the hit rate, the corrected false alarm rate for spiders was: (Number of spider false alarms ϩ 0.5)/(total number of blank trials ϩ 1). Because all blanks (total number of trials was 80) were shown at the shortest SOA (12 milliseconds), the false alarm rate for each category was constant for the four SOAs. Because blanks were used to determine false alarms, this signal detection analysis isolated how well participants could distinguish between specific targets and blanks. Results were comparable for an analysis (not reported here) that assessed how well participants could distinguish targets from nontargets other than blanks.
A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed to study effects of SOA on recognition (dЈ). Although a similar analysis was performed on response biases (C), it is not reported because its meaning is limited and because it is irrelevant for the interpretation of the present results. First, because the false alarm rate for a category was constant over SOAs (as it was derived from the blank trials), C changed as a direct consequence of changes in recognition. That is, with the constant false alarm rate over SOAs, an increase in hit rates with longer SOAs resulted in increases in dЈ and also (as a concomitant) in a stronger tendency to indicate that a target was recognized (i.e., C would appear to be lower). Second, because the present study focused on individual differences (between-subjects effects) at particular SOAs rather than on changes of response biases over SOAs (within-subjects effects), this aspect of the analysis is irrelevant for the interpretation of the present results.
In most cases, the direction of effects was clearly predicted from theory (e.g., spider fear would correlate with more liberal response biases to spiders). Therefore, significance tests were two-tailed only if findings of an association were novel (e.g., relationship between disgust sensitivity and threat recognition). Furthermore, for all ANOVAs with repeated measures, significance levels ( p Ͻ .05) were Greenhouse-Geisser corrected.
Results
Spider Fear, Snake Fear, Disgust Sensitivity, and Trait Anxiety
Scores on the prerecruitment 4-item questionnaires for spider fear and snake fear covered the full range of the scales (between 0 and 24). These fear scores correlated specifically with spider fear (SPQ) and snake fear (SNAQ) assessed at the end of the experiment (rs Ͼ .82, p Ͻ .001). Because SPQ has 18 items and the SNAQ has 20 items, fear was expressed as percentage scores to permit direct comparison of mean levels of spider and snake fear. The means (SD) were 32.60% (27.93) on the SPQ and 26.89% (24.98) on the SNAQ; thus, mean levels of fear were comparable, t ϭ 1.20. Mean disgust sensitivity was 15.40 (3.99) and mean trait anxiety was 38.98 (7.86). Split-half reliabilities (odd vs. even items) were, after Spearman-Brown correction for number of items, r ϭ .93 for SPQ, .91 for SNAQ, .75 for disgust sensitivity, and .84 for trait anxiety. Results reported below remained unaffected after trait anxiety was partialed out.
Although earlier evidence indicated that the subscales of the disgust sensitivity scale do not exhibit acceptable psychometric properties (Björklund & Hursti, 2004) , a recent study suggests the use of three revised subscales (core, animal reminder, and contamination-based disgust) as well as a revised global scale after removal of seven problematic items from the original disgust sensitivity scale (Olatunji et al., 2007) . In the present study, the original global scale correlated highly with the revised global scale (r ϭ .95) and also with the subscales (core, r ϭ .83; animal reminder, r ϭ .77; contamination-based, r ϭ .59). Results are reported only for the original global disgust scale unless findings for the revised scales deviated from those of the original score.
The top part of Table 1 shows correlations among spider fear (SPQ), snake fear (SNAQ), and disgust sensitivity. As shown, spider fear and snake fear were not correlated. Disgust sensitivity did not correlate with spider fear but with snake fear.
Picture Ratings
A repeated-measures ANOVA of picture ratings showed a significant main effect of picture category, F(3, 156) ϭ 95.22, p Ͻ .001; and subsequent t tests between the categories were also significant, paired t(52) Ͼ 5.14, p Ͻ .001. Mean ratings decreased significantly from flowers (M ϭ 1.77, SD ϭ 1.08) to mushrooms (M ϭ 0.53, SD ϭ .85) to snakes (M ϭ Ϫ.65, SD ϭ 1.32) to spiders (M ϭ Ϫ1.96, SD ϭ 1.32).
The middle part of Table 1 shows correlations of spider fear (SPQ), snake fear (SNAQ), and disgust sensitivity with spider ratings and snake ratings. The finding for disgust sensitivity extends previous findings that after spider fear was partialed out, disgust sensitivity predicted disgust ratings to a (plastic) spider in a behavioral avoidance test (Olatunji & Deacon, 2008) . Although disgust sensitivity correlated also with more negative snake ratings, this effect was no longer significant after snake fear was partialed out.
Recognition Task: Self-Report
The bottom part of Table 1 shows correlations of spider fear (SPQ), snake fear (SNAQ), and disgust sensitivity with selfreported recognition performance, picture clarity, and picture count. As shown, spider fear correlated with reported spider recognition after potential biases in responding (i.e., reported snake recognition) were partialed out. Spider fear correlated also with clarity ratings of spiders after clarity ratings of snakes were partialed out. Further, spider fear correlated with reported number of seen spiders after reported number of snakes was partialed out. Similarly, snake fear correlated with self-reported snake recognition and clarity of snake pictures after potential biases were partialed out. In contrast, disgust sensitivity did not correlate with Note. Spider fear was measured with an 18-item questionnaire and snake fear with a 20-item questionnaire (Klorman et al., 1974) , and disgust sensitivity with a 32-item scale (Haidt et al., 1994 
Recognition Task: Manipulation Check of SOA
The proportion of (corrected) false alarm rates to the blanks differed among picture categories, F(3, 156) ϭ 7.09, p Ͻ .001. Mean (SD) corrected false alarm rates were 23.75% (10.17) for spiders, 22.42% (9.60) for snakes, 33.09% (15.91) for flowers, and 21.98% (12.93) for mushrooms. Paired t tests showed that the mean false alarm rates for flowers exceeded those of the other categories (t(52) Ͼ 2.98, p Ͻ .005) with no differences among the other categories (t Ͻ 1). These findings suggests that overall, participants had a tendency to misinterpret blanks as flowers.
Changes in SOA had strong effects on recognition for each picture category. Figure 2 shows mean recognition scores (dЈ) for spiders, snakes, flowers, and mushrooms over SOAs. In a repeated-measures ANOVA of dЈ with category (snake, spider, flower, mushroom) and SOA (four levels) as within-subjects variables, there was an interaction of category with SOA, F(9, 468) ϭ 19.41, p Ͻ .001; a main effect of SOA, F(3, 156) ϭ 825.74, p Ͻ .001; and a main effect of category, F(3, 156) ϭ 38.66, p Ͻ .001. Separate ANOVAs for each category showed that the main effect of SOA was significant for each category, all F(3, 156) Ͼ 228.70, p Ͻ .001. As shown in Figure 2 , recognition at the 200-ms SOA showed clear ceiling effects (the absolute maximum dЈ was 2.65). In support, Levine tests indicated that the variances over SOAs were significantly reduced at 200-ms SOA for all picture categories, F(3, 208) Ͼ 16.42, p Ͻ .001. Similarly, the variance was significantly reduced for flowers from the 24-ms SOA to the 12-ms SOA, F(1, 104) Ͼ 3.81, p Ͻ .05. Further, at the 12-ms SOA, spider and flower recognition were at chance (t Ͻ 1). Because of these ceiling and floor effects, subsequent correlation analyses were limited to the middle SOAs to maximize power. However, note that correlations with disgust sensitivity (reported below) remained unaffected when recognition scores included the 12-ms SOA as well as the middle SOAs.
Because the interaction of SOA and picture category might have been confounded by the floor and ceiling effects, a follow up analysis included only the middle SOAs to determine whether a change in masking parameters (i.e., SOA changed from 24 to 36 milliseconds) had similar effects on recognition for the four picture categories. The repeated-measures ANOVA of dЈ with category (snake, spider, flower, mushroom) and SOA (24 and 36 milliseconds) as within-subjects variables showed an interaction of category with SOA, F(3, 156) 
Recognition Task: Correlations With Fear and Disgust Sensitivity
Signal detection indexes (dЈ and C) were correlated with spider fear, snake fear, and disgust sensitivity to study effects of individual differences on recognition (dЈ) and response bias (C). Figure 2 . Mean (and SE) recognition scores (dЈ) for spiders, snakes, flowers, and mushrooms over stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs, in milliseconds) . Note that the 12-ms SOA showed floor effects for spiders and flowers, whereas the 200-ms SOA showed ceiling effects for all picture categories (absolute maximum dЈ ϭ 2.65). Table 2 , results provided no evidence that spider fear (or snake fear) correlated with recognition (dЈ) of spiders (or snakes). Because effects might have been small but not significant for individual SOAs, recognition was also computed from combined SOAs of 24 and 36 milliseconds; 12 and 24 milliseconds; and 12, 24, and 36 milliseconds. For spider fear, the largest correlation with spider dЈ was r ϭ .10, p Ͼ .45. For snake fear, the largest correlation with snake dЈ was at the combined 24-ms and 36-ms SOA, r ϭ .21, p Ͻ .07, one-tailed. However, after disgust sensitivity was partialed out, this correlation dropped to zero, r ϭ .02. Further inspection of the data did not reveal curvilinear relationships.
Recognition. As shown in
In contrast, disgust sensitivity correlated with spider and snake recognition (at two-tailed significance testing) but not with recognition of mushrooms and flowers (r Ͻ .17, p Ͼ .20). Indeed, when the data from the 24-ms and 36-ms SOAs were combined (see Table 2 ), the correlations between disgust sensitivity and spider and snake recognition remained significant (r Ͼ .34) after potential confounds were partialed out from these variables (i.e., dЈ for mushrooms and flowers, spider and snake fear, spider and snake ratings, C for spiders and snakes, trait anxiety, and age). Notably, the core disgust subscale of the revised disgust sensitivity scale (Olatunji et al., 2007) showed similar partial correlations with spider and snake recognition (r Ͼ .37) whereas the animal reminder and contamination-based disgust subscales did not (r Ͻ .13).
Response bias. As shown in Table 2 , spider fear but not snake fear or disgust sensitivity correlated with response biases (C) to threat pictures. Specifically, fear of spiders was associated with less conservative response biases (i.e., less positive C) for responding spider. This correlation remained significant (r ϭ Ϫ.28) after potential confounds were partialed out from both variables (i.e., dЈ for spiders and snakes, disgust sensitivity, snake fear, spider and snake ratings, C for snakes, trait anxiety, and age). Notably, the correlation between spider fear and spider C at the 36-ms SOA (r ϭ Ϫ.39) was significantly larger than the corresponding correlation of r ϭ Ϫ.04 for snakes, Z ϭ 1.90, p Ͻ .03. Inspection of the data did not suggest that there was a curvilinear relationship between snake fear and response biases to snakes.
Discussion
Although spider fear and snake fear correlated with selfreported threat recognition (spiders or snakes), neither fear correlated with actual threat recognition. In contrast, disgust sensitivity correlated with recognition of spiders and snakes (but not with recognition of flowers and mushrooms). Further, spider fear correlated with the tendency to misinterpret blanks as spiders (response bias), and this correlation (at the 36-ms SOA) exceeded the corresponding correlation between snake fear and response biases for snakes.
As shown in Figure 2 , changes in masking parameters (SOA) had strong effects on recognition performance. Because of floor effects at the shortest SOA (12 milliseconds) and ceiling effects at the longest SOA (200 milliseconds), analyses focused on the middle SOAs (24 and 36 milliseconds). However, even for these two intervals, there was an interaction between SOA and picture category; this suggests that changes in masking parameters may not have uniform effects on recognition of different picture categories (Wiens, 2006a) . As further shown in Figure 2 , overall recognition differed among picture categories. Across participants, recognition was greater for mushrooms than for snakes and greater for snakes than spiders and flowers. Although this pattern of recognition differences among categories appears to challenge the idea that emotions facilitate recognition, we argue that these results are not a valid test of this idea. The main reason is that to evaluate the role of emotion properly, there ought to be little if any difference in perceptual features among the picture categories. Although we tried to equate pictures on luminance, contrast, and number of pixels, we cannot rule out that several differences in features (e.g., general shape of object) remained. Therefore, we suggest that differences in recognition among categories are mainly because of differences in these low-level features. Importantly, any effects of these features did not confound our results because they would not bias correlations with individual difference variables.
After the recognition task, participants were asked to rate their own performance in recognizing each picture category relative to the performance of the average participant. Results (in Table 1) showed that spider fear and snake fear correlated with the belief in one's own superiority in recognizing threat (spiders or snakes). This finding corresponds to the observation that spider phobics reported seeing spiders more quickly than do other people (Mayer, Merckelbach, & Muris, 2000) . Note. For disgust sensitivity, correlations with dЈ control both variables for potential confounds (i.e., dЈ for mushrooms and flowers, spider and snake fear, spider and snake ratings, C for spiders or snakes, trait anxiety, and age). Correlations between disgust sensitivity and dЈ for mushrooms and flowers, r Ͻ .17, p Ͼ .20. N ϭ 53. a These trends were eliminated after disgust sensitivity was partialled out, r Ͻ .02. b Negative correlations indicate that higher fear or disgust sensitivity was associated with less conservative response biases. c A partial correlation that controlled both variables for potential confounds (i.e., dЈ for spiders and snakes, disgust sensitivity, snake fear, spider and snake ratings, C for snakes, trait anxiety, and age) remained significant, r ϭ Ϫ. Further, spider fear and snake fear correlated with ratings of picture clarity of threat. However, results (in Table 2 ) provided no evidence that spider fear (or snake fear) was associated with actual recognition of spiders (or snakes). The strongest trend for a correlation was observed between snake fear and snake recognition; however, disgust sensitivity could account statistically for this relationship. In fact, because the present results showed that disgust sensitivity correlated with recognition, these findings suggest that the null findings for fear did not result from low power. Therefore, the present null findings replicate and extend previous evidence that fear is not associated with increased threat recognition in center view (Becker & Rinck, 2004; Ö hman & Soares, 1994; Windmann & Krüger, 1998; Winton et al., 1995) . However, because this research has focused on fear as a trait variable, it is unresolved whether there may be interactions between trait and state effects. For example, attentional biases in social phobics vary with state anxiety (Garner, Mogg, & Bradley, 2006) . To conclude, when taken together with meta-analytic evidence that anxious people show attentional biases to threat (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) , our findings confirm notions that fear and anxiety are not associated with superior threat recognition but with prioritized processing of threat stimuli after their recognition (Mathews & Macleod, 1994) .
The present findings further showed that whereas spider fear and snake fear did not correlate with threat recognition, disgust sensitivity did. This relationship was significant after potential confounds were partialed out (i.e., dЈ for mushrooms and flowers, spider and snake fear, spider and snake ratings, C for spiders or snakes, trait anxiety, and age). Further, this relationship was specific to the dimension of core disgust, which refers to direct threat of disease and a sense of offensiveness (Olatunji et al., 2007) . Thus, aspects of animal reminder disgust (e.g., hand preserved in a jar) or contamination-based disgust (e.g., chocolate shaped like dog poo) appear to be irrelevant to threat recognition.
These findings extend previous findings of correlations between disgust sensitivity and attentional bias toward disgust words in Stroop tasks (Charash & McKay, 2002) , although it is unclear why previous research did not find a correlation between disgust sensitivity and recognition of disgust in facial expressions and body movements (Rozin, Taylor, Ross, Bennett, & Hejmadi, 2005) . Because the present study found no evidence that threat recognition correlates with fear of spiders or snakes, individual differences in threat recognition apparently do not mediate the relationship between disgust sensitivity and fear of spiders or snakes (Klieger & Siejak, 1997; Tolin et al., 1997) . Although the causal nature of the relationship between disgust and fear of spiders or snakes remains unclear (e.g., Edwards & Salkovskis, 2006) , disgust sensitivity may be a predisposition rather than a consequence of fear (Muris, 2006) . In support of this possibility, mothers' disgust sensitivity predicts spider fear in children (Davey, Forster, & Mayhew, 1993) , and disgust sensitivity is unaffected by behavioral treatment of spider fear in children (de Jong, Andrea, & Muris, 1997) .
Whereas there was no apparent relationship between fear and threat recognition, there was clear evidence for a relationship between spider fear and the tendency to misinterpret blanks as spiders (response bias). First, spider fear correlated with the reported number of seen spiders in the recognition task (see Table 1 ). Second, spider fear correlated with less conservative response biases to spiders (see Table 2 ). This correlation was significant after potential confounds were partialed out (i.e., dЈ for spiders and snakes, disgust sensitivity, snake fear, spider and snake ratings, C for snakes, trait anxiety, and age). These results replicate and extend previous findings (Becker & Rinck, 2004) and are consistent with findings that spider phobics report to mistake objects in daily life for spiders (Mayer et al., 2000) . Evidence suggests that this response bias to spiders is specific to spider fear. When spider phobics, spider enthusiasts, and nonfearful participants were shown ambiguous (morphed) pictures of spiders and flowers, the spider phobics showed a bias toward categorizing ambiguous pictures as spiders whereas the spider enthusiasts did not show this bias (Kolassa et al., 2007) .
A potential concern with our findings may be that in the recognition task, participants were forced to respond spider, snake, flower, or mushroom. Because participants could not respond that they did not see anything, it may be argued that our task produced response biases. However, because in masking studies, participants often report that they do not see anything even on target trials (Wiens & Ö hman, 2007) , our task maximized sensitivity in assessing both hits and false alarms. Nonetheless, it is possible that spider-fearful participants did not see (consciously) any spiders at all and that our results show only that they favor the spider response button. This explanation is inconsistent with the finding that spider fear correlated with the number of spiders that participants reported to have seen consciously in the recognition task. Therefore, the parsimonious explanation of our findings is that spider-fearful participants are more likely than nonfearful participants to experience blanks as spiders.
Taken together, the studies that have found a relationship between spider fear and response biases to spiders provide strong evidence for response biases in fear. Thus, fear is associated with a greater concern for missing a target than for responding with false alarms. This behavior matches that of a smoke detector: Many responses may be false alarms and thus wasteful, but the consequences of missing a target (i.e., fire or feared object) are considered to be greater than those of many false alarms (Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Nesse, 2001 Nesse, , 2005 .
However, there was no evidence for a relationship of snake fear with reported number of seen snakes (see Table 1 ) or with response biases to snakes (see Table 2 ). It is unlikely that differences in fear levels or fear variability (restricted range) biased results, because fear levels and variability were comparable for spider fear and snake fear. Also, mean recognition and response biases were comparable for snakes at the 24-ms SOA and for spiders at the 36-ms SOA; nonetheless, only spider fear correlated with response biases to spiders. However, participants overall rated snakes as less negative than spiders; but, correlations between levels of fear and ratings of feared pictures (spiders or snakes) were comparable for spider fear and snake fear. This suggests that relative to fearless participants, snake-fearful participants rated snakes to be as negative as spider-fearful participants rated spiders to be negative. At the minimum, the present results suggest that the relationship between spider fear and response biases to spiders may be stronger than the corresponding relationship between snake fear and response biases to snakes. A possible reason for this effect may be that, compared to spiders, snakes are rare in most industrial countries. Therefore, even if people are afraid of snakes, they may have little reason to mistake an object for a snake.
Finally, we note a peculiarity in the present results. As shown in Table 1 , spider fear did not correlate with disgust sensitivity. Because this null finding does not replicate previous findings (e.g., de Jong & Merckelbach, 1998) , it is possible that our sample was not entirely representative. However, the remainder of our results replicated and extended previous results. For example, we found a strong correlation between snake fear and disgust sensitivity. Whereas previous research found a relationship with food-related disgust sensitivity (Klieger & Siejak, 1997) , our findings extend this relationship to general disgust sensitivity.
To conclude, the present study suggests that spider fear and snake fear may not be associated with threat recognition in center view but, rather, with the tendency to misinterpret nonthreatening cues as threatening (response bias). In contrast, disgust sensitivity may be associated with threat recognition (spiders and snakes) but not with response bias. Because fearful people reported threats that were not actually there (false alarms), whereas disgust-sensitive people actually recognized the threat, these findings imply that fear betrays, but disgust you can trust.
